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The paper shows that Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is a device to enhance
potential litigants’ bargaining position rather than to re-allocate risk. Being
insured decreases the cost an insured party has to bear if settlement negotia-
tions fail and the case goes to trial. This shifts the threat points, which has
an impact on the bargaining result. In negative expected value suits, LCI
can make the threat to sue credible and motivate potential defendants to
make positive settlement oﬀers. Hence, even risk-neutral agents may ﬁnd it
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21. Introduction
The literature on the economic analysis of insurance can be separated into three bran-
ches, namely the analysis of re-allocation of risk1, of adverse selection2, and of moral
hazard3 eﬀects of insurance. The ﬁrst of these branches examines the risk-allocation
among agents with diﬀerent risk attitudes. In general, it is eﬃcient if agents with higher
risk aversion buy insurance from agents with lower risk-aversion. Adverse selection might
lead to market failure if types of agents with higher risks cannot be separated ex-ante
from those with lower risks. Finally, the moral hazard branch points out that insurance
might lead to the choice of a lower level of precaution.
According to this, demand for insurance is created out of diﬀerent risk attitudes or the
agent’s interest in substituting precaution for insurance. This implies that, if agents are
risk-neutral and precaution plays no role, nothing can be gained from buying insurance.
In this paper, I analyze Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) as a strategic device that inﬂuences
the interaction with other agents. The paper therefore proposes to add a new branch to
the insurance literature. I show that agents might have a demand for LCI even if they
are risk-neutral and if there is no way to inﬂuence the probability of a conﬂict that might
lead to litigation. Hence, it is not the aspect of risk-allocation that makes LCI beneﬁcial
for potential litigants, but rather the possibility to improve their strategic position in a
law suit.
LCI has two strategic eﬀects in a game with settlement bargaining and trial. First of
all, LCI can make the plaintiﬀ’s threat to sue credible even if the case has a negative
expected value (NEV)4. Without LCI, this threat would be noncredible, and the potential
defendant could not be motivated to make or accept a positive settlement oﬀer. When
the settlement negotiations take place, the insurance rate is already sunk. The second
strategic eﬀect of LCI is to shift the bargaining range and therefore the settlement result.
This eﬀect can make LCI attractive for both of the litigants even in a positive expected
value (PEV) suit.
LCI is thus shown to be a useful institution which is required to ensure legal protection
for property rights of low value, but does not necessarily lead to more litigation5. Some
auhors, however, critizise that LCI might lead to civil courts’ caseload and to a kind of
”arms race” among potential litigants6. The caseload hypothesis was empirically rejected
1See e.g. Arrow (1971) and Stiglitz (1974).
2See Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) on signalling eﬀects in the insurance market, or Akerlof (1970),
who applied this approach to a broader range of topics.
3See e.g. Shavell (1979).
4The idea to turn a NEV case into a positive expected value case by distributing the litigation costs
over time is due to Bebchuk (1996).
5See also Kirstein (1998).
6E.g., see Adams (1981) and Adams/Blankenburg (1983).
3at least for Germany7. My model allows to derive conditions under which the arms race
hypothesis is valid; it also provides conditions under which this result can be avoided.
The insurance parameters can be set in a way that settlement is induced without an
arms race taking place.
The paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2 presents the model.
• In section 3, the equilibrium solution for positive and negative expected value suits
is derived.
• Section 4 presents the main results an discusses brieﬂy the impact of some modi-
ﬁcations of the assumptions I made.
2. The model
Consider two risk-neutral players, P and D, that engage in a dangerous activity. For
example, P is a pedestrian, D a driver; the latter might cause an accident that harms
the former. The interaction takes place in three stages:
• The insurance stage: P and D simultaneously decide whether to buy a Legal
Cost Insurance (LCI) or not.
• The accident stage: An accident might occur with probability γ, which causes
harm to P, whose value of not having to suﬀer this harm is X.
• The litigation stage If an accident has occured, the parties negotiate on a sett-
lement. If they reach an agreement, the game ends with a payment S from D to
P. If the parties do not reach an agreement, P has to decide whether to proceed
to trial or not. In case of trial, the judge decides with probability π in favor of P.
Figure 1 represents these three stages graphically. The tree starts at the bottom with
the decision of the parties whether to insure or not. Since this decision takes place
simultaneously, the two decision nodes of D are within one information set, which is
indicated by a dashed line between these two nodes.
The insurance stage leads to four possible combinations of decisions; to simplify ﬁgure
1, I cut out three of the subgames that arise out of the insurance stage, as it is indicated
by the dashed box. Thus, ﬁgure 1 shows the accident and litigation stages only for
one of these four branches, namely the combination e = f and g = 0 (where only P is
insured).
7See Blankenburg/Fiedler (1981) and Rennen (1983); a more recent empirical study for the
german Federal Government showed similar results, see Jagodzinski, W./Raiser, T./Riehl, J.
(1993).
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The accident stage is represented by the box labelled with ”A”. Either no accident
occurs with probability 1 − γ;0 < γ < 1 and the game ends8. Or, in case of an accident
(with probability γ), the parties enter the litigation stage. The parties have no mean to
inﬂuence γ. This assumption was made to exclude any precaution eﬀect on the insurance
decision.
First, they negotiate on a settlement. These negotiations are represented by the box
labelled with the word ”settlement”. If the bargaining range, denoted as R, is non-
empty, the parties reach a settlement, and the game end with a payment S ∈ R form D
to P. If, however, the bargaining range is empty, P has to decide whether to proceed to
trial or not. I furthermore assume zero negotiation costs and equal bargaining power.
In case of trial, the plaintiﬀ P has to bear costs that are denoted as c(e), where e ∈
{0;f},f > 0 is the insurance fee. e = 0 means that P is uninsured and has to pay his
8The possibility of opportunistic suits is thus excluded. See Kirstein/Schmidchen (1996) and (1997)
for an analysis of opportunistic suits and judicial detection skill.
5full costs, whereas e = f means that P is insured and only has to bear a deduction
c(f) which is non-negative, hence c(0) > c(f) ≥ 0. The trial costs of the defendant D
are respectively denoted as c(g) with the insurance fee g ∈ {0;f}. Litigation costs are
allocated according to the American rule: Each party has to bear its own trial costs.
P prevails in trial with probability π ∈]0,1[. Hence, his expected payoﬀ from proceeding
to trial is πX minus the trial costs c(e) minus the insurance fee e he paid in advance.
D’s expected payoﬀ in case of a trial is −πX −c(g)−g (recall that in the example tree,
g is zero). If P does not proceed to trial, the parties only have to bear their insurance
fees, if they have bought an inurance during the ﬁrst stage.
I assume that the insurance fee is valid for one period and that γ is the probability of
an accident during this period. Furthermore, I assume that the parties have the same
expectations concerning the probabilities γ and π.
3. Equlibrium analysis
3.1 The litigation stage
If settlement negotiations fail, P will proceed to trial if, and only if, the expected payoﬀ
impact of the trial is positive. This is the expected judgement πX minus the trial costs
P has to bear, namely c(e). Hence, P will try the case if, and only if, c(e) < πX. The
expected net value of a trial is πX − c(e) for P and −πX − c(g) for D. If P does not
proceed to trial, the value of this decision is zero for both of the parties.
The settlement range R is determined by the decision of P. He will only accept settlement
oﬀers S that exceed the value of his decision, namely:
S ≥
￿
0 : πX < c(e)
πX − c(e) : πX > c(e)
If he credibly threats to proceed to trial, P will only accept settlement payments that
exceed the (positive) net expected value of the trial9. If, on the other hand, his threat
to proceed is non-credible he would accept any positive settlement payment.
D anticipates the trial decision of P and will only accept settlement payments that hold
−S ≥
￿
0 : πX < c(e)
−πX − c(g) : πX > c(e)
If D expects P to proceed to trial, he would accept any settlement payment that is
smaller than his expected loss from trial, S < πX +c(g). If he expects P not to proceed,
9For simpliﬁcation, I assume that a settlement oﬀer is also acceptable if it equals the threat point.
6D will only make negative settlement oﬀers. From these considerations, the settlement
range can be derived10:
R =
￿
[πX − c(e),πX + c(g)] : πX > c(e)
{0} : πX < c(e)
If πX > c(e) holds, the parties reach a settlement with S ∈ [πX − c(e),πX + c(g)]. If,
on the other hand, πX < c(e) holds, neither settlement nor trial will take place. The
bargaining position of P depends on the cridibility of his trial threat11 Let me now deﬁne
• πX > c(0) as Positive Expected Value (PEV) case,
• πX < c(0) as Negative Expected Value (NEV) case, and
• c(f) < πX as the Credibility Condition.
This allows to derive the ﬁrst result of this paper:
Proposition 1: If, in NEV cases, P is not insured, then his trial threat is
non-credible. If the LCI holds the Credibility Condition, then it would make
his trial threat credible.
Moreover, in NEV cases, an LCI that holds the Credibility Condition motivates D to
make a positive settlement oﬀer. The reason is that an LCI decreases the costs a plaintiﬀ
has to bear in case of trial. The insurance fee is sunk when then the plaintiﬀ has to make
his trial decision, hence it is only the deduction that is relevant when P has to make
this decision. LCI can be interpreted as distribution the total litigation costs over time
- which can turn NEV suits into credible threats, as anlyzed by Bebchuk (1996).
Under the assumption of equal bargaining power, the settlement payment the parties





The share of a party’s litigation costs that is coverd by the LCI hence is 2h. Since an LCI
contract consists of the insurance fee and the deduction or the amount that is covered,
each possible LCI contract can be described by the parameters (f,h) for comparative
statics purposes.
Taking into account the eﬀect of NEV suits and assuming that LCI holds the Credibility
Condition, the settlement results S = S(e,g) with e,g ∈ {0;f} are:
10Again for simpliﬁcation, I treat R = {0} as equivalent to ”‘no settlement”’, because the consequences
of these two events are just the same.
11See Gould (1973) or Nalebuff (1987, 198).
7• S(f,f) = πX + c(f) − c(f)
2 = πX
• S(f,0) = πX + d(0) − p(f)
2 = πX + h
• S(0,f) =
(
0 : πX < p(0)
πX + c(f) − c(0)
2 = πX − h : πX > p(0)
• S(0,0) =
(
0 : πX < p(0)
πX + c(0) − c(0)
2 = πX : πX > p(0)
Obviously, in PEV cases S(f,0) > S(f,f) = S(0,0) > S(0,f) holds, whereas in NEV
cases S(f,0) > S(f,f) > S(0,0) = S(0,f) holds.
3.2 The insurance stage
3.2.1 The decision situation
In the insurance stage P expects to receive X −e if no accident occurs (with probability
1−γ), and S(e,g)−e in case an accident has occured (with probability γ). His optimal
insurance decision is
e
∗ = argmax γS(e,g
∗) + (1 − γ)X − e
with e ∈ {0;f}. D expects −g if no accident occurs and −S −g in case of accident. His
optimal decision is
g
∗ = argmin γS(e
∗,g) + (1 − γ)g
with g ∈ {0;f}. The following two sections show the insurance stage as a 2x2 game,
where the payoﬀs are the subgame value of the litigation stage as derived in the previous
section.
3.2.2 Positive expected value cases
Let me ﬁrst consider the positive expected value case. Table 1 shows the insurance
stage as a 2x2 game. In this game, P’s strategy e = 0 means not to insure, whereas
e = f denotes the decision for insurance. The equilibrium analysis leads to the following
result:
Proposition 2: In a PEV case, the strategy combination (e = f,g = f) is a
Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies if, and only if, f < γh. This Nash
equilibrium is Pareto-ineﬃcient.
8Table 1: Insurance stage, PEV case
D g = 0 g = f
P
−γπX −γ(πX − h) − f
e = 0
(1 − γ)X + γπX (1 − γ)X + γ(πX − h)
−γ(πX + h) −γπX − f
e = f
(1 − γ)X + γ(πX + h) − f (1 − γ)X + γπX − f
If the LCI fee is too small, the parties are in a prisoners’ dilemma situation: It is indivi-
dually rational to insure, because this improves the bargaining result, but if both parties
are insured, the settlement payment is just the same as between uninsured parties12. If,
on the other hand, the LCI fee is suﬃciently high, namely f > γh, then the strategy
combination (e = 0,g = 0) is the Nash equilibrium, which is Pareto-eﬃcient.
3.2.3 Negative expected value cases
The insurance stage in the NEV case is represented in table 2.
Table 2: Insurance stage, NEV case




(1 − γ)X (1 − γ)X
−γ(πX + h) −γπX − f
e = f
(1 − γ)X + γ(πX + h) − f (1 − γ)X + γπX − f
12N.B. that this result is not entirely driven by the assumption that the parties face equal litigation
costs and insurance fees. The prisoners’ dilemma result is not excluded if diﬀerent litigation costs
and insurance fees are assumed.
9This game can have three diﬀerent Nash equilibria in pure strategies, as the next pro-
position claims:
Proposition 3: In NEV cases, the Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the
insurance stage game are13:
• (e = 0,g = 0) if, and only if, f > γ(πX + h)
• (e = f,g = 0) if, and only if, γ(πX + h) > f > γh
• (e = f,g = f) if, and only if, f < min{γh;γπX}
(e = 0,g = f) will never be a Nash equilibrium, since f > 0. The game does
not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if, and only if, γh > f > γπX.
Figure 2 shows the possible parameter constellations and the resulting equlibria. The
lower diagonal line represents f = γh; above this line, the condition f > γh is fulﬁlled.
The upper diagonal line stands for f = γ(πX + h), the horizontal line (which is partly
dashed) represents f = γπX.
LCI contracts with (f,h) combination that are situated between these lines in ﬁgure
2 would implement the strategy combination (e = g,g = 0) as the Nash equilibrium.
This holds above the dashed line as well as below. (f,h) combinations above the upper
diagonal line would implement (e = 0,g = 0). If the LCI contracts consist of para-
meter constellation above the horizontal line, but below the lower diagonal line, then
the insurance stage game would have no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Below the
horizontal and the lower diagonal line, (e = f,g = f) would be implemented.
If the legal system aims to protect the legitimate claim of P and simultaneously to
disencourage D from buying insurance only for redistributive purposes, then the Nash
equilibrium (e = f,g = 0) should be implemented by setting the insurance fee f such
that
γ(πX + h) > f > γh
with 2h = c(0) − c(f).
13Proof of Proposition 3:
• If f > γ(πX + h), then e = 0 is the dominant strategy for P; g = 0 is always the best
answer of D on this. Hence, regardless of D’s best answer on e = f, the Nash equilibrium is
(e = 0,g = 0), q.e.d.
• If f > γh, then g = 0 is the dominant strategy of D; with γ(πX +h) > f, the best answer of P
is e = f. Hence, regardless of P’s best answer on g = f, the Nash equilibrium is (e = f,g = 0),
q.e.d.
• If f < min{γh;γπX}, which implies γ(πX +h) > f, the strategy e = f is dominant for P and
the best answer of D would be g = f. Hence, regardless of D’s best answer on e = 0, the Nash
equilibrium is (e = f,g = f), q.e.d.





f = γπX + γh f
h
(e = 0,g = 0)
(e = f,g = 0)
(e = f,g = f)
no NE
4. Results and discussion
The three propositions derived in the prvious sections allow to state some results:
• In NEV suits, where the threat to sue is non-credible and thus the defendant is
not motivated to make a positive settlement oﬀer, an LCI that holds the Credi-
bility Condition provides a credible threat for the plaintiﬀ and thereby induces a
settlement.
• Even in PEV suits, LCI can be attractive for the parties in order to improve their
settlement position. However, they might be in a prisoners’ dilemma (”arms race”)
situation.
• It is possible to regulate LCI such that legimate claims lead to positive settlements,
but arms races (in PEV cases ) and insurance only for redistributive purposes (in
NEV cases) are prevented.
The litgation fee f and the deduction c(f) should be set up in a way that the conditions
c(f) < πX and γ(πX+h) > f > γh with 2h = c(0)−c(f) are fulﬁlled. Then LCI provides
a credible trial threat, induces a settlement solution in NEV cases, and simultaneously
prevents a prisoners’ dilemma (”arms race”) in PEV cases. In equilibrium, such an LCI
contract is attractive for potential plaintiﬀs, even though the model has excluded re-
allocation of risk as well as substitution of precaution eﬀort.
11The assumptions that were made to set up the model look quite restricitve: Litigation
costs for both parties, insurance fees, and deductions are equal, the American rule go-
verns the cost allocation, the parties share common beliefs on the probabilities of the
accident and of the plaintiﬀ’s victory in court, the damage is common knowledge, the
parties know the other one’s threat point in the settlement negotiations.
To relax some of these assumptions might lead to diﬀerent results. E.g. Bebchuk (1984)
and (1988) analyzes settlement under imcomplete information - in these models the
plaintiﬀ can hope for a positive settlement even in NEV cases14. However, to replace the
American by the British cost allocation rule would lead to very similar conditions for
Nash Equilibria, which would allow to state the same qualitative results as above in this
section. The same holds for the introduction of diﬀerent litigation costs, deductions, or
insurance fees. The conditions for equilibria then turn out to be more complicated, but
still allow for the same interpretations as derived from the easier model presented here.
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